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Abstract
This paper provides a counterexample about the asymptotic behavior of the solutions of a
discounted Hamilton-Jacobi equation, as the discount factor vanishes. The Hamiltonian of the
equation is a 1-dimensional continuous and coercive Hamiltonian.
1 Introduction and main result
Let n ≥ 1. Denote by Tn = Rn/Zn the n-dimensional torus. For c ∈ R, consider the Hamilton-
Jacobi equation
H(x,Du(x)) = c (E0)
where the Hamiltonian H : Tn × Rn → R is jointly continuous and coercive in the momentum. In
order to build solutions of the above equation, Lions, Papanicolaou and Varadhan [6] have introduced
a technique called ergodic approximation. For λ ∈ (0, 1], consider the discounted Hamilton-Jacobi
equation
λvλ(x) +H(x,Dvλ(x)) = 0 (Eλ) (1.1)
By a standard argument, this equation has a unique viscosity solution vλ : T
n → R. Moreover,
(−λvλ) converges uniformly as λ vanishes to a constant c(H) called the critical value. Set uλ :=
vλ+c(H)/λ. The family (uλ) is equi-Lipschitz, and converges uniformly along subsequences towards
a solution of (E0), for c = c(H). Note that (E0) may have several solutions. Recently, under the
assumption that H is convex in the momentum, Davini, Fathi, Iturriaga and Zavidovique [2] have
proved that (uλ) converges uniformly (towards a solution of (E0)). In addition, they proved that
the solution can be characterized using Mather measures and Peierls barriers.
Without the convexity assumption, the question of whether (uλ) converges or not remained open.
This paper solves negatively this question and provides a 1-dimensional continuous and coercive
Hamiltonian for which (uλ) does not converge
∗.
Theorem 1.1. There exists a continuous Hamiltonian H : T1 × R → R that is coercive in the
momentum, such that uλ does not converge as λ tends to 0.
∗CNRS, Paris Dauphine University, PSL, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75016 Paris, France.
E-mail: ziliotto@math.cnrs.fr
∗Note that for time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi equations, several counterexamples about the asymptotic behavior
of solutions have been pointed out in [1].
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The example builds on a class of discrete-time repeated games called stochastic games. The main
ingredient is to establish a connection between recent counterexamples to the existence of the limit
value in stochastic games (see [8, 9]) and the Hamilton-Jacobi problem†.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the stochastic game example.
Section 3 shows that in order to prove Theorem 1.1, it is enough to study the asymptotic behavior
of the stochastic game, when the discount factor vanishes. Section 4 determines the asymptotic
behavior of the stochastic game.
2 The stochastic game example
Given a finite set A, the set of probability measures over A is denoted by ∆(A). Given a ∈ A,
the Dirac measure at a is denoted by δa.
2.1 Description of the game
Consider the following stochastic game Γ, described by:
• A state space K with two elements ω1 and ω−1: K = {ω1, ω−1},
• An action set I = {0, 1} for Player 1,
• An action set J = {2−√2 + 2−2n, n ≥ 1} ∪ {2−√2} for Player 2,
• For each (k, i, j) ∈ K × I × J , a transition q(. |k, i, j) ∈ ∆(K) defined by:
q(. |ω1, i, j) = [ij + (1− i)(1 − j)]δω1 + [i(1 − j) + (1− i)j]δω−1 ,
q(. |ω−1, i, j) = [i(1 − j) + (1− i)j]δω1 + [ij + (1− i)(1− j)]δω−1 .
• A payoff function g : K × I × J → [0, 1], defined by
g(ω1, i, j) = ij + 2(1 − i)(1 − j) and g(ω−1, i, j) = −ij − 2(1 − i)(1− j).
Let k1 ∈ K. The stochastic game Γk1 starting at k1 proceeds as follows:
• The initial state is k1. At first stage, Player 2 chooses j1 ∈ J and announces it to Player
1. Then, Player 1 chooses i1 ∈ I, and announces it to Player 2. The payoff at stage 1 is
g(k1, i1, j1) for Player 1, and −g(k1, i1, j1) for Player 2. A new state k2 is drawn from the
probability q(. |k1, i1, j1) and announced to both players. Then, the game moves on to stage
2.
• At each stage m ≥ 2, Player 2 chooses jm ∈ J and announces it to Player 1. Then, Player
1 chooses im ∈ I, and announces it to Player 2. The payoff at stage m is g(km, im, jm) for
Player 1, and −g(km, im, jm) for Player 2. A new state km+1 is drawn from the probability
q(. |km, im, jm) and announced to both players. Then, the game moves on to stage m+ 1.
†Let us mention the work [4, 5, 3, 10] as other illustrations of the use of repeated games in PDE problems.
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Remark 2.1. The action set of Player 2 can be interpreted as a set of randomized actions. Indeed,
imagine that Player 2 has only two actions, 1 and 0. These actions are called pure actions. At
stage m, if Player 2 chooses jm ∈ J , this means that he plays 1 with probability jm, and 0 with
probability 1− jm. Denote by j˜m ∈ {0, 1} his realized action. Player 1 knows jm before playing, but
does not know j˜m. If Player 1 chooses im ∈ I afterwards, then the realized payoff is g(km, im, j˜m).
Thus, the payoff g(km, im, jm) represents the expectation of g(km, im, j˜m). Likewise, the transition
q(. |km, im, jm) represents the law of q(km, im, j˜m). The transition and payoff in Γ when players play
pure actions can be represented by the following matrices:
Table 1: Transition and payoff functions in state ω1 and ω−1
ω1 1 0
1 1
−→
0
0
−→
0 2
ω−1 1 0
1 −1 ←−0
0
←−
0 −2
The left-hand side matrix stands for state ω1, and the right-hand side matrix stands for state ω−1.
Consider the left-hand side matrix. Player 1 chooses a row (either 1 or 0), and Player 2 chooses a
column (either 1 or 0). The payoff is given by the numbers: for instance, g(1, 1) = 1 and g(1, 0) = 0.
The arrow means that when the corresponding actions are played, the state moves on to state ω−1;
otherwise, it stays in ω1. For instance, q(.|ω1, 1, 1) = δω1 and q(.|ω1, 1, 0) = δω−1 . The interpretation
is the same for the right-hand side matrix. In the game Γ, Player 1 can play only pure actions (1 or
0), and Player 2 can play 1 with some probability j ∈ J .
This matrix representation is convenient to understand the strategic aspects of the game.
Let us now define formally strategies. In general, the decision of a player at stage m may depend on
all the information he has: that is, the stage m, and all the states and actions before stage m. In this
paper, it is sufficient to consider a restricted class of strategies, called stationary strategies. Formally,
a stationary strategy for Player 1 is defined as a mapping y : K × J → I. The interpretation is that
at stage m, if the current state is k, and Player 2 plays j, then Player 1 plays y(k, j). Thus, Player
1 only bases his decision on the current state and the current action of Player 2. Denote by Y the
set of stationary strategies for Player 1.
A stationary strategy for Player 2 is defined as a mapping z : K → J . The interpretation is that at
stage m, if the current state is k, then Player 2 plays z(k). Thus, Player 2 only bases his decision
on the current state. Denote by Z the set of stationary strategies for Player 2.
The sequence (k1, i1, j1, k2, i2, j2, ..., km, im, jm, ...) ∈ H∞ := (K×I×J)N∗ generated along the game
is called history of the game. Due to the fact that state transitions are random, this is a random
variable. The law of this random variable depends on the initial state k1 and the pair of strategies
(y, z), and is denoted by Pk1y,z.
We will call gm the m-stage random payoff g(km, im, jm). Let λ ∈ (0, 1]. The game Γk1λ is the game
where the strategy set of Player 1 (resp. 2) is Y (resp. Z), and the payoff is γk1λ , where
γk1λ (y, z) = E
k1
y,z

∑
m≥1
(1− λ)m−1gm

 .
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The goal of Player 1 is to maximize this quantity, while the goal of Player 2 is to minimize this
quantity. The game Γk1λ has a value, that is:
min
z∈Z
max
y∈Y
γk1λ (y, z) = maxy∈Y
min
z∈Z
γk1λ (y, z).
The value of Γk1λ is then defined as the above quantity, and is denoted by wλ(k1). A strategy for
Player 1 is optimal if it achieves the right-hand side maximum, and a strategy for Player 2 is optimal
if it achieves the left-hand side minimum. The interpretation is that if players are rational they
should play optimal strategies, and as a result Player 1 should get wλ(k1), and Player 2 should get
−wλ(k1).
2.2 Asymptotic behavior of the discounted value
As we shall see in the next section, for each λ ∈ (0, 1], one can associate a discounted Hamilton-
Jacobi equation with c(H) = 0, such that its solution evaluated at x = 1 is approximately wλ(ω1),
for λ small enough. Thus, the asymptotic behavior of this quantity needs to be studied.
Define λn := 2
−2n
(
3
4
− 1√
2
)−1
and µn := 2
−2n−1
(
3
4
− 1√
2
)−1
.
Proposition 2.2. The following hold:
(i) wλ(ω−1) ≤ wλ(ω1) ≤ wλ(ω−1) + 2
(ii) limn→+∞wλn(ω1) = 1/
√
2 and lim infn→+∞wµn(ω1) > 1/
√
2. Consequently, (wλ(ω1)) does
not have a limit when λ→ 0.
The proof of the above proposition is done in Section 4. As far as the proof of Theorem 1.1 is
concerned, the key point is (ii). is Let us give here some piece of intuition for this result. Consider
the game Γ′ that is identical to Γ, except that Player 2’s action set is [0, 1] instead of J . For each
λ ∈ (0, 1], denote by w′λ its discounted value. Because J ⊂ [0, 1], Player 2 is better off in the game Γ′
compared to the game Γ: w′λ ≤ wλ. Interpret now Γ and Γ′ as games with randomized actions, as in
Table 2.1. As λ vanishes, standard computations show that an (almost) optimal stationary strategy
for Player 2 in Γ′ω1λ is to play 1 with probability p
∗(λ) := 2 − √2 +
(
3
4 − 1√2
)
λ in both states ω1
and ω−1, and (wλ(ω1)) converges to 1√2 .
Moreover, for all n ≥ 1, p∗(λn) ∈ J . Thus, this strategy is available for Player 2 in Γ, and conse-
quently wλn(ω1) = w
′
λn
(ω1) +O(λn), as n tends to infinity.
On the other hand, for all n ≥ 1, p∗(µn) /∈ J , and the distance of p∗(µn) to J is larger than(
3
4 − 1√2
)
µn/2. Consequently, the distance of the optimal strategy in Γ
ω1
µn to the optimal strategy
in Γ′ω1µn is of order µn. This produces a payoff difference of order µn at each stage, and thus of order
1 in the whole game. Thus, Player 2 is significantly disadvantaged in Γω1µn compared to Γ
′ω1
µn , and the
difference between wµn(ω1) and w
′
µn(ω1) is of order 1.
Remark 2.3. As we shall see in the following section, we have limλ→0 λwλ(ω1) = limλ→0 λwλ(ω−1) =
0.
The next section explains how to derive the counterexample and Theorem 1.1 from Proposition
2.2.
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3 Link with the PDE problem and proof of Theorem 1.1
The following proposition expresses wλ as the solution of a functional equation called Shapley
equation.
Proposition 3.1. Let λ ∈ (0, 1] and uλ := (1 + λ)−1wλ/(1+λ). For each r ∈ {−1, 1}, the two
following equations hold:
(i)
wλ(ωr) = min
j∈J
max
i∈I
{g(ωr, i, j) + (1− λ) [q(ωr|ωr, i, j)wλ(ωr) + q(ω−r|ωr, i, j)wλ(ω−r)]}
(ii)
λuλ(ωr) = min
j∈J
max
i∈I
{g(ωr, i, j) + q(ω−r|ωr, i, j) [uλ(ω−r)− uλ(ωr)]}
Proof. (a) The intuition is the following. Consider the game Γωrλ . At stage 1, the state is ωr.
The term g represents the current payoff, and the term (1 − λ)[...] represents the future
optimal payoff, that is, the payoff that Player 1 should get from stage 2 to infinity. Thus,
this equation means that the value of Γωrλ coincides with the value of the one-stage game,
where the payoff is a combination of the current payoff and the future optimal payoff. For
a formal derivation of this type of equation, we refer to [7, VII.1., p. 392].
(b) Evaluating the previous equation at λ/(1 + λ) yields
w λ
1+λ
(ωr) = min
j∈J
max
i∈I
{
g(ωr, i, j) +
1
1 + λ
[q(ωr|ωr, i, j)w λ
1+λ
(ωr) + q(ω−r|ωr, i, j)w λ
1+λ
(ω−r)]
}
Using the fact that q(ωr|ωr, i, j) = 1− q(ω−r|ωr, i, j) yields the result.
For p ∈ R, define H1 : R→ R and H−1 : R→ R by
H1(p) :=


−min
j∈J
max
i∈I
{g(ω1, i, j) − p · ([i(1 − j) + (1− i)j]} , if |p| ≤ 2,
H1
(
2 p|p|
)
+ |p| − 2 if |p| > 2.
H−1(p) :=


−min
j∈J
max
i∈I
{g(ω−1, i, j) + p · ([i(1 − j) + (1− i)j]} , if |p| ≤ 2,
H−1
(
2 p|p|
)
+ |p| − 2 if |p| > 2.
For x ∈ [−1, 1] and p ∈ R, let
H(x, p) := |x|H1(|p|) + (1− |x|)H−1(|p|). (3.1)
Note that the definition ofH1 andH−1 for |p| > 2 ensures that lim|p|→+∞H1(p) = lim|p|→+∞H−1(p) =
+∞, thus lim|p|→+∞H(p) = +∞. Note also that for all x ∈ [−1, 1], H1(x, .) is increasing on [−2, 2]
and H−1(x, .) is decreasing on [−2, 2].
Thanks to Proposition 3.1 (ii) and Proposition 2.2 (i), we have λuλ(ω1)+H1(uλ(ω1)−uλ(ω−1)) = 0
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and λuλ(ω−1) +H−1(uλ(ω1)− uλ(ω−1)) = 0.
For x ∈ [−1, 1], let uλ(x) = |x|uλ(ω1) + (1 − |x|)uλ(ω−1). Let x ∈ (−1, 1) \ {0}. Proposition
2.2 (i) implies that wλ(ω−1) ≤ wλ(ω1), thus uλ(ω−1) ≤ uλ(ω1) and |Duλ(x)| = uλ(ω1) − uλ(ω−1).
Consequently, Proposition 3.1 (ii) yields
λuλ(x) +H(x,Duλ(x)) = 0. (3.2)
Note that the above equation is identical to equation (3.2). The reason why we use the notation uλ
and not vλ is that, as we shall see, c(H) = 0, thus uλ coincides with vλ.
Extend uλ and H(., p) (p ∈ R) as 2-periodic functions defined on R. The Hamiltonian H is
continuous and coercive in the momentum, and the above equation holds in a classical sense for all
x ∈ R \ Z.
For x ∈ R, denote by D+uλ(x) (resp., D−uλ(x)) the super-differential (resp., the sub-differential) of
uλ at x. Let us show that uλ is a viscosity solution of (3.2) on R. By 2-periodicity, it is enough to
show that this is a viscosity solution for x = 0 and x = 1.
Let us start by x = 0. We have D+uλ(0) = ∅ and D−uλ(0) = [uλ(ω−1)−uλ(ω1), uλ(ω1)−uλ(ω−1)].
Let p ∈ D−uλ(0). Then H−1(p) ≥ H−1(uλ(ω1)−uλ(ω−1)) = −λuλ(ω−1), thus λuλ(0)+H(0, p) ≥ 0.
Consequently, uλ is a viscosity solution at x = 0.
Consider now the case x = 1. We have D+uλ(1) = [uλ(ω−1) − uλ(ω1), uλ(ω1) − uλ(ω−1)] and
D−uλ(1) = ∅.
Let p ∈ D+uλ(1). Then H1(p) ≤ H1(uλ(ω1) − uλ(ω−1)) = −λuλ(ω1), thus λuλ(1) + H(1, p) ≥ 0.
Consequently, uλ is a viscosity solution at x = 1.
Let us now conclude the proof of Theorem 1.1. Because H is 2-periodic, equation (3.2) can be
considered as written on T1.
As noticed before, equation (3.2) is identical to equation (1.1). Therefore, as stated in the
introduction, −λuλ converges to c(H). Proposition 2.2 (ii) implies that (−λnuλn(1)) converges to
0, thus c(H) = 0. Still by Proposition 2.2 (ii), (uλ(1)) does not have a limit when λ tends to 0:
Theorem 1.1 is proved.
4 Proof of Proposition 2.2
4.1 Proof of (i)
Consider Proposition 3.1 (i) for r = 1. Take j = 1/2 ∈ J . It yields
wλ(ω1) ≤ max
i∈I
{
1 + (1− λ)
(
1
2
wλ(ω1) +
1
2
wλ(ω−1)
)}
= 1 +
1
2
(1− λ) (wλ(ω1) + wλ(ω−1)) . (4.1)
Take i = 1/2. This yields
wλ(ω1) ≥ 1
2
+
1
2
(1− λ) (wλ(ω1) + wλ(ω−1)) . (4.2)
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For r = −1, taking j = 1/2 and then i = 1/2 produce the following inequalities:
wλ(ω−1) ≤ −1
2
+
1
2
(1 − λ) (wλ(ω1) + wλ(ω−1)) , (4.3)
and
wλ(ω−1) ≥ −1 + 1
2
(1− λ) (wλ(ω1) + wλ(ω−1)) . (4.4)
Combining (4.2) and (4.3) yield wλ(ω1) ≥ wλ(ω−1) + 1 ≥ wλ(ω−1). Combining (4.1) and (4.4) yield
wλ(ω−1) ≥ wλ(ω1)− 2, and (i) is proved.
4.2 Proof of (ii)
For (i, i′) ∈ {0, 1}2, consider the strategy y of Player 1 that plays i in ω1 and i′ in ω−1 (regardless
of Player 2’s actions), and the strategy z of Player 2 that plays a in state ω1, and b in state ω−1.
Denote γi,i
′
λ (a, b) := γ
ω1
λ (y, z) (resp., γ˜
i,i′
λ (a, b) := γ
ω−1
λ (y, z)), the payoff in Γ
ω1
λ (resp., Γ
ω−1
λ ), when
(y, z) is played.
Proposition 4.1. The following hold:
1.
γ0,0λ (a, b) =
−2(a− b− λ+ bλ)
λ(a+ b+ λ− aλ− bλ)
γ1,1λ (a, b) = −
a− b+ λb
λ(a+ b+ λ− aλ− bλ− 2)
γ1,0λ (a, b) =
2a+ 2b+ 2λ− ab− aλ− 2bλ+ abλ− 2
λ(b− a+ λa− bλ+ 1)
γ0,1λ (a, b) = −
2a+ 2b− ab− 2bλ+ abλ− 2
λ(a− b− aλ+ bλ+ 1)
2. • γ0,0λ is decreasing with respect to a and increasing with respect to b.
• γ1,1λ is increasing with respect to a and decreasing with respect to b.
• γ1,0λ is increasing with respect to a and b.
• γ0,1λ is decreasing with respect to a and b.
Proof. 1. The payoffs γ0,0λ (a, b) and γ˜
0,0
λ (a, b) satisfy the following recursive equation:
γ0,0λ (a, b) = a(1− λ)γ˜0,0λ (a, b) + (1− a)(2 + (1 − λ)γ0,0λ (a, b))
γ˜0,0λ (a, b) = a(1− λ)γ0,0λ (a, b) + (1− a)(−2 + (1− λ)γ˜0,0λ (a, b))
Combining these two relations give the first equality. The three other equalities can be derived
in a similar fashion.
2. These monotonicity properties are simply obtained by deriving γi,i
′
λ with respect to a and b.
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For λ ∈ (0, 1], set p∗(λ) := 2−
√
2+
(
3
4
− 1√
2
)
λ. Define a strategy y of Player 1 in the following
way:
• in state ω1, play 0 if j ≤ p∗(λ), play 1 otherwise,
• in state ω−1, play 1 if j ≤ p∗(λ), play 0 otherwise.
The rationale behind this strategy can be found in Section 2.2.
For all n ≥ 1, define
λn :=
2−2n
3
4
−
√
2
and µn :=
2−2n−1
3
4
−
√
2
.
Proposition 4.2. The following hold:
1.
lim
n→+∞minz∈Z
γλn(y, z) =
1√
2
2.
lim
n→+∞minz∈Z
γµn(y, z) =
5
2
√
2
− 1 > 1√
2
Proof. 1. For all (i, i′) ∈ {0, 1},
lim
n→+∞ γ
i,i′
λn
(p∗(λn), p∗(λn)) =
1√
2
,
and the result follows.
2. Let z be a strategy of Player 2, and a = z(ω1) and b = z(ω−1).
Note that the interval (p∗(µn/2), p∗(2µn)) does not intersect J .
The following cases are distinguished:
Case 1. a ≤ p∗(µn) and b ≤ p∗(µn), thus a ≤ p∗(µn/2) and b ≤ p∗(µn/2)
We have γω1µn(y, z) = γ
0,1
µn (a, b) ≥ γ0,1µn (p∗(µn/2), p∗(µn/2)) →
n→+∞
5
4
√
2− 1
Case 2. a ≤ p∗(µn) and b ≥ p∗(µn), thus a ≤ p∗(µn/2) and b ≥ p∗(2µn)
We have γω1µn(y, z) = γ
0,0
µn (a, b) ≥ γ0,0µn (p∗(µn/2), p∗(2µn)) →
n→+∞ −
1 + 2
√
2
8(−2 +√2)
Case 3. a ≥ p∗(µn) and b ≤ p∗(µn), thus a ≥ p∗(2µn) and b ≤ p∗(µn/2)
We have γω1µn(y, z) = γ
1,1
µn (a, b) ≥ γ1,1µn (p∗(2µn), p∗(µn/2)) →
n→+∞ (−1/16)
−25 + 14√2√
2− 1
Case 4. a ≥ p∗(µn) and b ≥ p∗(µn), thus a ≥ p∗(2µn) and b ≥ p∗(2µn)
We have γω1µn(y, z) = γ
1,0
µn (a, b) ≥ γ1,0µn (p∗(2µn), p∗(2µn)) →
n→+∞ −2 + 2
√
2
Among these cases, the smallest limit is 54 (
√
2− 1), and the result follows.
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